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Social Beneﬁts and Losses
from FDI
Two Nontraditional Views
Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen
9.1 Introduction
It is commonly believed that foreign direct investment (FDI) is beneﬁ-
cial for growth in less developed countries. Among other things, direct
investment by multinational corporations in developing countries is con-
sidered a major channel for access to advanced technologies owned by the
major industrial countries. In particular, technological diﬀusion can take
place through imports of new varieties of inputs. This is in addition to the
usual role of FDI as a channel for bringing in foreign savings to augment
the stock of domestic capital. Both the technology-transfer and the tra-
ditional capital-augmenting roles of FDI translate into greater income
growth in the host country. Indeed, in a sample of sixty-nine developing
countries over the period 1970–89, Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee
(1998) provide evidence of (a) complementarity between FDI and human
capital on income growth; (b) complementarity between FDI and non-
FDI domestic investment; and (c) productivity gains from FDI exceeding
those from non-FDI domestic investment.1
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1. The contribution of FDI to growth is evident only when the interaction between human
capital and FDI is included in the regression analysis. Their interpretation is that FDI ﬂows
311F D Ic a ni m p r o v ee ﬃciency by promoting competition. The large size of
multinational enterprises and the advanced technology they possess often
enable them to invest in industries in which barriers to entry (such as large
capital requirements) limit the potential access of local competitors.2
Overall, the ﬁrst view of FDI that we shall take in this paper focuses on
their eﬀects on technology transfer and promotion of competition. These
eﬀects are in addition to the traditional gains from trade aﬀorded by FDI,
i.e., the blending of foreign savings with domestic savings to ﬁnance do-
mestic investment. We shall formalize these eﬀects in a stylized model and
provide a quantitative assessment of the welfare gains from FDI by de-
composing them according to their technology transfer eﬀect and compe-
tition promotion eﬀect, on top of the traditional gains from intertemporal
trade. In doing this, we follow Romer’s (1994) argument in relation to the
welfare costs of trade barriers: In assuming that the set of goods in an
economy never changes, the typical economic model predicts an eﬃciency
loss from a tariﬀ which is second-order small (in the order of the square
of the tariﬀ rate). By relaxing this assumption and assuming instead that
international trade can bring new goods to the economy, the fraction of
national income lost when a tariﬀ is imposed can be much larger (as much
as two times the tariﬀ rate).
Another important aspect of FDI is that, in situations of illiquidity asso-
ciated with global ﬁnancial crises, FDI provides the only direct link be-
tween the domestic capital market in the host country and the world capi-
tal market at large. For instance, FDI ﬂows to the East Asian countries
were remarkably stable during the global ﬁnancial crises of 1997–98. In
sharp contrast, portfolio equity and debt ﬂows as well as bank loans dried
up almost completely during the same period. This resilience of FDI to
ﬁnancial crisis was also evident in the Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Latin
American debt crisis of the early 1980s. This may reﬂect a unique property
of FDI, which is determined by considerations of ownership and control
by multinationals of domestic activities which are more long term in na-
ture, rather than by short-term ﬂuctuations in the value of domestic cur-
rency and the availability of credit and liquidity.3
However, the resilience of FDI ﬂows may come at a cost to the host
primarily to sectors which use technology similar to that used in the source country. Thus,
the interaction of FDI with human capital is important for explaining its role on productivity.
By contrast, non-FDI domestic investment may largely follow more traditional activities, and
thus the interaction eﬀects between overall domestic investment and human capital are small
in their regression. Corroborative evidence found by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) shows that
multinational enterprises are active in sectors that use relatively high-skilled workers.
2. In some cases, however, the presence of multinationals may drive out less eﬃcient local
ﬁrms and ultimately reduce competition.
3. During a crisis, though, foreign direct investors may contribute to capital withdrawals
by accelerating proﬁt remittances or reducing the liabilities of aﬃliates towards their mother
companies. While these are not recorded as negative FDI ﬂows, they result from decisions
made by foreign investors.
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from the host country, their investment may exacerbate distortions in the
domestic capital market. The distortions originate from the lack of cor-
porate transparency, which gives rise to asymmetric information between
“insiders” and “outsiders” of ﬁrms operating in the domestic economy,
including ﬁrms owned and controlled by the foreign direct investors. The
domestic capital market could be trapped in a “lemons” situation de-
scribed by Akerlof (1970): At the price oﬀered by uninformed equity-
buyers, which reﬂects the average productivity of ﬁrms whose shares are
sold in the market, owners of ﬁrms (including FDI-owned ﬁrms) which
have experienced a higher-than-average value will pull out of the market.
This adverse selection problem in the domestic equity market could be
magniﬁed by the introduction of FDI ﬂows, resulting in excessive invest-
ment by the foreign direct investors and at the same time worsening the
misincentives for the domestic savers.4 These social losses may signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the attractiveness of FDI to the host country. Typically also,
the domestic investment undertaken by FDI establishments is heavily
leveraged through the domestic credit market. As a result, the fraction
of domestic investment actually ﬁnanced by foreign savings through FDI
ﬂows may not be as big as it may seem, and the size of the traditional
gains from FDI may thus be further limited by this domestic leverage.
The second view of FDI that we shall take in this paper focuses on such
perverse interactions between FDI and the domestic capital market, which
implies that FDI ﬂows may bring losses to the host country. We model
this interaction in an asymmetric information framework. Paralleling the
welfare assessments of FDI based on the ﬁrst view, we shall also try to
quantify the possible gains and losses from trade based on this second
view of FDI and disentangle these nontraditional gains/losses from the
traditional gains from trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with an analysis
of the second view in section 9.2, followed by a parallel analysis of the ﬁrst
view in section 9.3. Numerical simulations are used to assess the possible
welfare gains/losses these two nontraditional aspects of FDI may bring to
the host country relative to the traditional gains. Section 9.4 concludes.
9.2 FDI: Interactions with the Domestic Credit Market
In this section and the next, we assume a two-period model of a small,
capital-importing country, referred to as the home country. It is assumed
4. There is no direct evidence on the extent of undersaving resulting from these misincen-
tives. A somewhat related study by the World Bank (1999) shows, however, that the correla-
tion between FDI ﬂows and total factor productivity growth in developing countries with
high saving rates is positive and signiﬁcant, whereas in countries with low saving rates the
correlation is negative and signiﬁcant.
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small enough that, in the absence of any government intervention, it faces
a perfectly elastic supply of external funds at a given risk-free world rate
of interest, r*.
Let us begin with the second view of FDI. We follow Gordon and Bo-
venberg (1996) and Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998a, 1999) in modelling
the risk in this economy. Suppose there is a very large number (N)o fe x
ante identical domestic ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm employs capital input (K) in the
ﬁrst period in order to produce a single composite good in the second
period. We assume that capital depreciates at the rate . Output in the
second period is equal to F(K)(1  ε), where F() is a production function
exhibiting diminishing marginal productivity of capital and ε is a random
productivity factor with zero mean and is independent across all ﬁrms. (ε
is bounded from below by 1, so that output is always non-negative.) We
assume that ε is purely idiosyncratic, so that there is no aggregate uncer-
tainty. Through optimal portfolio decisions, consumer-savers will thus be-
have in a risk-neutral way.
Investment decisions are made by the ﬁrms before the state of the world
(i.e., ε) is known.5 Since all ﬁrms face the same probability distribution of
ε, they all choose the same level of investment. They then seek funds to
ﬁnance the investment. At this stage, the owner-managers of the ﬁrms are
better informed than the outside fund-suppliers. There are many ways to
specify the degree of this asymmetry in information. In order to facilitate
the analysis, however, we simply assume that the owner-managers, being
“close to the action,” observe ε before they make their ﬁnancing decisions;
but the fund providers, being “far away from the action,” do not.
When investment is equity ﬁnanced, the original owner-managers ob-
serve ε while the new potential shareholders of the ﬁrm do not. The market
will be trapped in the lemons situation described by Akerlof (1970). At
the price oﬀered by the new (uninformed) potential equity buyers, which
reﬂects the average productivity of all ﬁrms (i.e., the average level of ε)
in the market, the owner-manager of a ﬁrm experiencing a higher-than-
average value of ε will not be willing to sell its shares and will pull out of
the market completely. The equity market will fail to serve its investment-
ﬁnancing functions eﬃciently. Elsewhere (Razin, Sadka, and Yuen 1999),
we have shown how another source of equity ﬁnance, namely, international
capital ﬂows in the form of FDI, may help mitigate this lemons problem
by creating an active (albeit distorted) domestic stock market that facili-
tates the channelling of domestic savings to ﬁnance new domestic invest-
ment—in addition to its usual role of channelling foreign savings to the
domestic capital market to help ﬁnance part of the new investment. De-
5. For a principal-agent foundation for such an economic structure under which invest-
ment is precommitted before the realization of the productivity parameter, see Sosner (1998).
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undersaving) that may result from the information asymmetry, the gains
from trade through FDI can be rather substantial.
However, when a domestic credit market is doing most of the job of
channelling domestic savings into domestic investment, the role of FDI
diminishes. In fact, it is often observed that FDI is highly leveraged do-
mestically. After gaining control of the domestic ﬁrm, a foreign direct in-
vestor usually resorts to the domestic credit market to ﬁnance new invest-
ment and possibly sell (shares of) the ﬁrm in the domestic equity market
later, after proﬁts from its original investment are realized. We thus extend
our analysis in the model below to include a domestic credit market and
reassess the gains from trade through FDI.
9.2.1 The FDI-Equity-Credit Equilibrium
In a formal sense, foreign acquisition of shares in domestic ﬁrms is clas-
siﬁed as FDI when the shares acquired exceed a certain fraction of owner-
ship (say, 10–20 percent). From an economic point of view, we look at FDI
not just as ownership of a sizable share in a company but, more impor-
tantly, as an actual exercise of control and management and acquisition of
inside information (the value of ε in our model).
The sequencing of ﬁrm decisions is as follows. Before ε is revealed to
anyone (i.e., under symmetric information), foreign investors bid up do-
mestic ﬁrms from their original domestic owners, investment decisions are
made, and full ﬁnancing through domestic credit is secured. Then, ε is
revealed to the owner-managers (who are all foreigners), but not to domes-
tic equity investors. At this stage, shares are oﬀered in the domestic equity
market and the ownership in some of the ﬁrms is transferred to the domes-
tic investors. In the initial stage (i.e., before ε is revealed to anyone), the
foreign direct investors are able to outbid the domestic savers because the
latter lack access to the large amounts of funds necessary to seize con-
trol of the ﬁrms, while the former, by assumption, are not liquidity con-
strained.6
Since credit is extended ex ante, before ε is revealed, ﬁrms cannot sign
default-free loan contracts with the lenders. We therefore consider loan
contracts which allow for the possibility of default. We adopt the “costly
state veriﬁcation” framework a ´ la Townsend (1979) in assuming that lend-
ers make ﬁrm-speciﬁc loans, charging an interest rate of rj to ﬁrm j( j 
6. The existence of wealthy individuals or families in the home country may limit the scope
of our analysis to the extent that they can compete with the foreign direct investors on control
over these greenﬁeld investment sites. Our analysis will carry over, however, if they form joint
ventures with the foreign direct investors. On the other hand, the foreign direct investors
need not be excessively resourceful. Even a small technological advantage they may enjoy
over the domestic investors will enable them to bid up all these investment sites from the
domestic investors and to gain control of these industries.
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payment commitment will be honored when the ﬁrms encounter relatively
good shocks, and defaulted when they encounter relatively bad shocks.
The loan contract is characterized by a loan rate (rj), with possible default,
and a threshold value (εj) of the productivity parameter as follows:
(1) FK K K K r j
jj j j j () ( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( ) . 11 1 1 0 ++ − = − − + ε 
When the realized value of εj is larger than εj, the ﬁrm is solvent and
will thus pay the lenders the promised amount, consisting of the principal
K j  (1  )K j
0 plus the interest rj[Kj  (1  )K j
0] as given by the right-
hand side of equation (1). If, however, εj is smaller than εj, the ﬁrm will
default. In the case of default, the lenders can incur a cost in order to
verify the true value of εj and to seize the residual value of the ﬁrm. This
cost, interpretable as the cost of bankruptcy, is assumed to be proportional
to the ﬁrm’s realized gross return, [F(Kj)(1  εj)  (1  )Kj], where 
 1 is the factor of proportionality. Net of this cost, the lenders will receive
(1  )[F(Kj)(1  εj)  (1  )Kj].
Since there is no aggregate risk, the expected rate of return required by
domestic consumer-savers, denoted by r, can be secured by suﬃcient di-
versiﬁcation. Therefore, the “default” rate of interest, rj, must oﬀe rap r e -
mium over and above the default-free rate, r,a c c o r d i n gt o
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where () is the cumulative probability distribution of ε, i.e., (εj) 
prob(ε  εj), and e(εj) is the mean value of ε realized by the low-
productivity ﬁrms, i.e., e(εj)  E(ε|ε  εj). For later use, we also denote
by e(εj) the mean value of ε realized by the high-productivity ﬁrms, i.e.,
e(ε0)  E(ε|ε  εj).7
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of equation (2) is the contracted
principal and interest payment, weighted by the no-default probability.
The second term measures the net residual value of the ﬁrm, weighted by
the default probability. The right-hand side is the no-default return re-
quired by the domestic lender. Observe that equations (1) and (2) together
imply that
[( ) ] () ( ) {( ) [ () ] ( ) }





















316 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen
7. The weighted average of e(εj)a n de(εj) must yield the average value of ε, i.e., (εj)e
(εj)  [1 (εj)]e(εj)  E(ε)  0. This in turn implies that e(εj) 
 0 while e(εj) 	 0, i.e.,
the expected value of ε for the “bad” (“good”) ﬁrm is negative (positive).Since e(εj) 
 εj and 0 1, it follows that rj 	 r, the diﬀerence being
a risk premium (which depends, among other things, on Kj, εj,a n d).
The ﬁrm in this setup is competitive (i.e., a price taker) only with respect
to r, the market default-free rate of return. This r cannot be inﬂuenced by
the ﬁrm’s actions. However, rj, Kj,a n dεj are ﬁrm speciﬁc and must satisfy
equations (1) and (2). In making its investment (i.e., choosing Kj  [1 
]K j
0) and its ﬁnancing (loan contract) decisions, the ﬁrm takes these con-
straints into account. Since these decisions are made before ε is known,
i.e., when all ﬁrms are (ex ante) identical, they all make the same decision.
We henceforth drop the superscript j.
In the equity market which opens after ε is revealed to the (foreign)
owner-managers, there is a cutoﬀ level of ε, denoted by ε0, such that all
ﬁrms experiencing a value of ε above ε0 will be retained by the foreign
direct investors and all other ﬁrms (with ε below ε0) will be sold to domes-
tic savers. This cutoﬀ level of ε is given by
(3 ) ′
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where e ˆ(ε, ε0)  E(ε|ε  ε  ε0) is the conditional expectation of ε given ε
lies between ε and ε0.
Notice that ﬁrms that experience a value of ε below ε default and have
zero value. These ﬁrms are not retained by the foreign direct investors;
hence ε0  ε. All other ﬁrms generate in the second period a net cash ﬂow
of [F(K)(1  ε)  (1  )K]  [K  (1  )K0](1  r). The left-hand side
of equation (3) represents the marginal (from the bottom of the distribu-
tion) ﬁrm retained by foreign investors. The right-hand side of equation
(3) is the expected value of the ﬁrms that are purchased by domestic sav-
ers. With a conditional probability of [(ε0)  (ε)]/(ε0), they generate
a net expected cash ﬂow of {F(K)[1  e ˆ(ε, ε0)]  (1  )K}  [K  (1 
)K0](1  r); and with a probability of (ε)/(ε0), they generate a zero net
cash ﬂow. This explains equation (3).
We can substitute equation (1) into equations (2)a n d( 3 ) in order to
eliminate r and then rearrange terms to obtain
(2) [ ( )] ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ( )]
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Consider now the capital investment decision of the ﬁrm that is made
before ε becomes known, while it is still owned by foreign direct investors.
With a probability of (ε0)  (ε), it will be sold to domestic savers who
pay a positive price equalling
{() [ ˆ(, ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) }
()
() [ ˆ(, ) ]
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by using equation (1). With a probability of 1  (ε0), it will be retained
by the foreign investors, for whom it is worth
























by using equation (1). Hence, the ﬁrm seeks to maximize
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subject to constraint (equation [2]), by choice of K and ε, given ε0.8 The
ﬁrst-order conditions are spelled out in the appendix.
The (maximized) value of V in equation (4) is the price paid by the for-
eign direct investors at the greenﬁeld stage of investment. Since the value
of ε is not known at this point, the same price is paid for all ﬁrms. The
low-ε ﬁrms are then (after ε is revealed to the foreign direct investors) re-
sold to domestic savers, all at the same price, because ε is not observed by
these savers. Net capital inﬂows through FDI are given by
8. The ε0-condition, as given by equation (3), is determined by equilibrium in the equity
market. As such, it will not be taken into account by the price-taking ﬁrms when choosing
their investment levels.
318 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen(5) FDI = −−
+
+ NF K e
r




00  εε ε
(see equation [4]). Unlike the case with no domestic credit (in which the
foreign direct investors have to bring in their own capital to ﬁnance the
domestic investment projects), all capital outlays are ﬁnanced domestically
and FDI consists only of the price paid for the ownership and control of
the high-ε ﬁrms.
The remainder of the equilibrium conditions is standard. The ﬁrst-
period resource constraint is given by
(6) FDI =− − − − NK K N FK c [() ] [ ( )] . 1 00 1 
The second-period resource constraint is
(7) FDI cN F K K r
NF K e K
2 11
11
=+ − − +
−+ + −
−
[() ( )] ( * )
() {( ) [ () ] ( ) } .

  εε
Note that the last term on the left-hand side of equation (7) reﬂects the
existence of real default costs. Finally, the consumer-savers do not have
access to the world capital market and can only borrow/lend from the do-
mestic market. As a result, in maximizing utility, they will equate their in-












In this model, the eight equations (i.e., [2], [3], [5]–[8] together with the
two ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the choice of K and ε) determine
the eight endogenous variables, i.e., K, r, r, ε, ε0, c1, c2, FDI, and the
LaGrange multiplier  associated with the constraint (equation [2]).
9.2.2 Gains from Trade
To ﬂesh out in a simpliﬁed manner the kind of gains or losses brought
about by FDI, we compare the laissez-faire allocation in the presence of
FDI with the closed economy laissez-faire allocation.
In the autarky case, the lemons problem will drive the equity market
out of existence. Firms will have to rely solely on the provision of domestic
credit in ﬁnancing its investment projects. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc debt contract
for any ﬁrm j continues to be characterized by a default-risky interest rate
(rj) and a threshold productivity level (εj) that satisfy the cutoﬀ condition
(equation [1]). The default-free interest rate (r) is still deﬁned implicitly by
equation (2). Again, since all ﬁrms are ex ante identical, we can drop the
Social Beneﬁts and Losses from FDI 319superscript j. The ﬁrm’s investment decision is to choose K, r,a n dε to
solve the following problem:
(4 ) max ′ −+ + −
−− −− +
−
(, , ) () ( ) {() [ ( ) ] ( )}
[( ) ] [ ( ) ] ( )










subject to equations (1) and (2). We can use equation (1) to substitute
o u tt h er i s k yi n t e r e s tr a t e( r)i ne q u a t i o n( 2 ) as well as in the objective
function above. The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to K and ε for this
reduced problem are laid out in the appendix. Utility maximization by
the consumer-savers continues to yield the same intertemporal condition
(equation [8]). In the absence of capital ﬂows, FDI  0 in the two resource
constraints (equations [6] and [7]). Together, these ﬁve conditions deter-
mine the ﬁve endogenous variables, i.e., K, r, ε, c1,a n dc2.
In the open economy case with domestic credit, FDI has conﬂicting
eﬀects on welfare. Its ﬁrst role (discussed in detail in Razin, Sadka, and
Yuen 1999) is to facilitate the channelling of domestic saving into domestic
investment by getting around a lemons problem and sustaining a domestic
equity market. This, by itself, is welfare enhancing; but, as we have already
indicated, FDI is driven also by distorted incentives, and its traditional
role of directing foreign savings into domestic investment may generate an
excessive stock of domestic capital (either when capital inﬂows are not
needed at all or, when they are needed to start with, too much of them
take place). This foreign overinvestment (coupled with possible domestic
over- or undersaving)—i.e., F(K) 
r* (and  r)—tends to reduce
welfare.
We use numerical examples to illustrate the total eﬀect of FDI on wel-
fare. In these examples, we employ a logarithmic utility function (u[c1, c2] 
ln[c1] ln[c2]), with a subjective discount factor , a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function (F[K]  AK), and a uniform distribution of ε deﬁned
over the interval (a, a). The welfare gain (loss) is measured by the uni-
form percentage change (in c1 and c2) which is needed in order to lift the
autarkic utility level to the FDI utility level. We set the parameter values
as 0.295, 0.333, 0.723, N  1, A  1, K0  1, a  0.99, and
0.05. This set of values yields a normalized output level of unity in
the initial period. Since we think of each period as constituting half the
lifetime of a generation (i.e., about twenty-ﬁve years), the values of  and
 are chosen in such a way as to reﬂect an annual time preference rate of
5 percent and an annual depreciation rate of 5 percent.
Unlike the case where domestic credit is not available (as analyzed
in Razin, Sadka, and Yuen 1999), an autarkic economy with a domestic
credit market can utilize domestic savings to debt-ﬁnance domestic invest-
ment. The crucial role of FDI as a vehicle for sustaining a domestic equity
320 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuenmarket through which domestic savings are channelled into domestic
investment is thus substantially diminished. Consequently, the negative
eﬀect of FDI associated with the distorted incentives emanating from the
domestic equity market dominates, and altogether there may exist a net
welfare loss from trade.9 Figure 9.1 illustrates the welfare gains and losses
occurring at various levels of the world rate of interest, r*, relative to the
autarky risk-free rate r. Among other things, three points are worth noting
from this ﬁgure. First, except for levels of r*  r ranging from 1.2 to 1.8
(equivalent to an annual real rate diﬀerential of 3.2 percent to 4.2 percent)
where some minimal welfare gains of 0.04 percent to 0.55 percent are re-
corded, welfare losses are prominent (about 2 percent at lower levels of
r*  r and increasing to more than 20 percent when r*  r exceeds 1.8).
Second, observe that there is a discrete jump in the welfare levels around
r*  r  1.8. Below that level, we have a low investment, low FDI equilib-
rium, with an investment rate of about 17 percent and a FDI/GDP ratio
of 6–8 percent. Above that, the investment rate surges to 25–26 percent
and the FDI/GDP ratio to 11–13 percent. The saving rate is relatively
stable, though—only slightly higher in the latter case (around 13 percent)
than in the former (around 10 percent). This suggests the possibility of
multiple equilibria driven by self-fulﬁlling expectations. Although the role
of FDI in ﬁnancing domestic investment is much less important relative
9. This possibility of losses from trade in an originally distorted economy can be viewed
as a corroboration of the earlier ﬁndings of Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) and Helpman
and Razin (1983).
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Fig. 9.1 Welfare gain/loss from FDI with domestic credit and equityto the scenario with no domestic credit (not shown here; see Razin, Sadka,
and Yuen 1999), foreign overinvestment (i.e., F[K] 
r*) prevails in
all these cases. So also does domestic oversaving (i.e., F[K] 	r).
Third, note that the autarkic default-free interest rate r ( 2.9) falls short
of all the values of r* considered here. So here we have the possibility that
although the FDI ﬂows are not fundamentally needed, they do neverthe-
less ﬂow in.
9.3 FDI: Technology Transfer and Promotion of Competition
We now return to discuss in detail the second view of FDI. We start
with an autarkic situation in the host country where only traditional inputs
are used for domestic production and the domestic input markets are
plagued by perils of imperfect competition. In this section, we assume that
FDI can bring new inputs to an economy and can promote competition
in the domestic input market. We view technology transfer as the introduc-
tion of new inputs brought in by the foreign direct investors in the sense
that productivity can be raised by the addition of more varieties of inputs.
Alternatively, we can view these new inputs as tradable goods and the
traditional inputs as nontradable goods. To illustrate the possible gains
from FDI in a partial equilibrium setting, we show in ﬁgures 9.2 and 9.3
the gains from the increase in the use of traditional inputs brought about
by increased competition (area B in ﬁgure 9.2)10 and from the introduction
of new inputs (area C in ﬁgure 9.3).
As in the previous section, the economy is producing a single, all-
purpose (consumption and capital) good with a composite capital input
through a Cobb-Douglas technology:















That is, capital is a composite of a number of varieties of individual inputs
(kj, j  1 , 2 ,..., M). The elasticity of substitution among these inputs is
given by (1/(1  ). In the absence of uncertainty, we can interpret the
production technology speciﬁed in section 9.2.2 as a special case of equa-
tion (9), with M  1.
It is easy to show that, holding the cost of production constant, a mere
increase in the number of inputs can generate more output. In particular,
suppose that either k ˆ units each of M kinds of inputs or k ˜ units each of M
 m kinds of inputs can be used to compose the same aggregate level of
10. Area A of ﬁgure 9.2 does not constitute any welfare gain or loss from increased compe-
tition because the gain in consumer surplus due to the fall in the input price from w (its
imperfectly competitive level) to 1 (its competitive level) is exactly oﬀset by the loss in pro-
ducer surplus.
322 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuencapital stock (K), i.e., Mk ˆ  (M  m)k ˜  K, and hence incur the same
input costs. Then
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Obviously, Y(M  m, k ˜) 	 Y(M, k ˆ)f o rm 	 0; i.e., there exist productivity
gains from an increase in the variety of inputs. From the growth account-
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Fig. 9.2 Gains from increase in competition in the use of traditional inputs
Fig. 9.3 Gains from the introduction of new inputsing perspective, a 1 percent growth in the variety of inputs will translate
into a (1  )/ percent growth in total output.
9.3.1 Autarky with Traditional Inputs and Imperfect Competition
We view the market structure for capital inputs as monopolistically
competitive. There are M symmetric input-coordinating ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm
will buy each speciﬁc input (ki) from the households at the competitive
price of unity and sell the aggregate stock to the ﬁnal producers at a mo-
nopolistically competitive price of wi.
Taking these input prices wi and the interest rate r as given, the ﬁnal
good producer chooses its quantities demanded for the capital inputs (ki)









































where mpki is the marginal product of the ith capital input, deﬁned as
(11a) mpk AK k ii ≡
−− 
 1.
As a monopoly supplier of capital inputs to the ﬁnal producers, the ith
input-coordinating ﬁrm will take the inverse demand functions wi(ki) (and
the competitive return of unity to be paid to the households) as given and
choose the quantities supplied of capital inputs ki to maximize its proﬁt
max
() () [() ].
k ii ii i
i
kw k k  ≡− 1
Solution to this problem yields the markup condition
(12) wk k ii ii () [ () ] , 11 −= 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324 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa YuenNote that with full depreciation (1) and when the number of capital
inputs is inﬁnitely large (M →∞ ), i(ki) 1 so that the markup, 1/[1
 i(ki)], becomes a constant equal to 1/ (	 1).
The problem of the consumer-saver (competitive supplier of domestic
savings) is the same as the one spelled out in section 9.2 above—except
that, instead of K0, he or she now takes M
j1kj0 as the initial endowment.
Solution to his or her utility maximization problem yields the standard
intertemporal condition (equation [8]), where (in the absence of default
risk here) r is simply the autarky interest rate.
Assuming symmetry in the capital inputs across ﬁrms, the economy-
wide resource constraints are given by
(6 ) ′ =− − − cN A M k M k k 10 0 1 {[ ( ) ] } ,
/   
and
(7 ) ′ =+ − cN A M k M k 2 1 [( ) ] .
/   
In this model, the ﬁve equations (i.e., [11], [12], [6], [7], [8]) determine
the ﬁve endogenous variables (c1, c2, k, w, r).
9.3.2 FDI with New Inputs and Increased Competition
The opening-up of the economy involves three features. First, because
of the diﬀerence between the world rate of interest r* and the autarky in-
terest rate r, capital will ﬂow in. Second, bundled with FDI, m new types
of capital inputs will be imported.11 Third, the increase in competition
(given the perfectly elastic supply of inputs from abroad) will drive wi to
its competitive level of unity.
In the presence of imported capital inputs and under a competitive
input market structure, the maximization problem facing the producer-
investors becomes the following:














































Solution to the problem yields the standard marginal productivity con-
dition
mpk r i =+ *, 
11. See also a similar setup in Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998).
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i except that K now includes
both traditional and new inputs.
The consumer-saver’s problem remains unchanged, except that the au-
tarky interest rate r is now replaced by the world rate of interest r*. As a
result, the intertemporal condition becomes










The two economy-wide resource constraints are modiﬁed as follows:
(6 ) FDI ′′ =+ − − − − N M m k Mk NAM k c [( ) ( ) ] ( ),
/ 1 00 1 
 
and
(7 ) FDI ′′ =+ + − + − + cN A M m k M m k r 2 11 [( ) ( ) ( )] ( * ) .
/   
In this model, the four equations (i.e., [11], [8], [6], and [7]) determine
the four endogenous variables (c1, c2, k, FDI).
9.3.3 Gains from Trade
As is clear from the discussion above, there are three possible sources
of gains from FDI ﬂows: (a) traditional gains (from the use of foreign
savings to augment the domestic capital stock), (b) gains from technology
transfer, and (c) gains from the promotion of competition in the input
market. The two nontraditional types (b) and (c) both result from the im-
portation of increased variety of capital inputs.
In the simulations reported below, we choose the same set of parameter
values as in section 9.2.2 above, i.e., 0.295, 0.333, 0.723, N 
1, and K0  1. In the benchmark model with both the technology-transfer
and competition-promotion features, we set 0.314, M  0.05, and m/
M  0. 1. The value of the production coeﬃcient A is reset from 1 to 24
so as to generate a normalized output level of unity in the initial period in
the presence of input variety M. The values of  and M are chosen in such
a way as to produce a markup of input price over its marginal cost of 1.4
as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). Our values of  and  also imply
a contribution of input variety to output growth (i.e.,   ln[Y ]/  ln[M] 
[1  ]/) of 0.728. In the alternative traditional model with perfectly
competitive input markets and without technology transfer, we set 
0.298 and m/M  0 so as to yield a unit markup.
The welfare gains from FDI between the benchmark and traditional
cases are compared in ﬁgure 9.4. In the latter case (solid line), the welfare
gains are positive as long as the interest diﬀerential between the world rate
and the autarky rate (r*  r) is nonzero. However, the relevant range for
our purpose (i.e., positive rather than negative capital inﬂows) is the
downward-sloping segment, when r* 
 r ( 3.051, or an annual rate of
326 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen5.76 percent). In comparison, the former case (dashed line) generates
much bigger welfare gains—as big as a 6 percent or greater diﬀerence in
lifetime consumption with a FDI/GDP ratio of 27 percent when r*  r 
1 (or an annual rate diﬀerential of 2.81 percent)—because of the tech-
nology transfer and competition promotion eﬀects. At r*  r (when the
traditional gains are absent), we still have a positive FDI/GDP ratio of 9
percent, producing a gain of 2.6 percent that represents a measure of these
nontraditional eﬀects.
In order to disentangle the two nontraditional eﬀects (b) and (c), we use
in ﬁgures 9.5 and 9.6 the traditional case as a frame of reference (solid line)
and consider variations in the technology transfer eﬀect and competition
promotion eﬀect. The former eﬀect is examined in ﬁgure 9.5 by varying
the m/M ratio from 0 percent (solid line) to 10 percent (dashed line) to 20
percent (dotted line). The latter eﬀect is studied in ﬁgure 9.6 by varying
the markup from unity (solid line) to 1.4 (dashed line; the Rotemberg-
Woodford 1995 number) to 2.0 (dotted line; Hall’s 1988 estimate). These
two ﬁgures are not easily comparable, but one message is clear: Both
eﬀects can generate large welfare gains through FDI inﬂows even in the
absence of traditional gains from FDI. In addition, when r*  r, the tech-
nology transfer eﬀect delivers a welfare gain of 1.9 percent when the m/M
ratio equals the benchmark value of 0.1 while the competition promotion
eﬀect induces a gain of 0.7 percent when the markup equals the bench-
mark value of 1.4. These two welfare numbers together make up the over-
all nontraditional gains of 2.6 percent found in the mixed case depicted by
ﬁgure 9.4.
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Fig. 9.4 Welfare gains from FDI with technology transfer and promotion of
competition vs. traditional gains from FDI9.4 Conclusion
International capital ﬂows typically fall into three major categories—
i.e., portfolio ﬂows, loans, and FDI—and perform a variety of functions
in the world economy. Their common traditional role lies in the blending
of foreign savings with domestic savings to ﬁnance domestic investment.
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Fig. 9.5 Welfare gains from FDI with technology transfer
Fig. 9.6 Welfare gains from FDI with promotion of competitionFDI, distinct from other types of capital ﬂows, performs two important
additional functions. First, FDI can be viewed not only as an exchange of
the ownership of domestic investment sites from domestic residents to for-
eign residents, but also as a corporate governance mechanism in which the
foreign investor exercises management and control over the host-country
ﬁrm. In so doing, the foreign direct investors gain crucial inside informa-
tion about the productivity of the ﬁrm under their control—an obvious
advantage over the uninformed domestic savers, who are oﬀering to buy
shares in the ﬁrm. Taking advantage of their superior information, the
foreign direct investors will tend to retain the high-productivity ﬁrms un-
der their ownership and control and sell the low-productivity ﬁrms to these
uninformed savers. This adverse selection problem, which plagues the do-
mestic stock market, leads to overinvestment by the foreign direct inves-
tors and, at the same time, to undersaving by the domestic residents.
A second view focuses on the eﬀects of FDI in facilitating technology
transfer through the importation of new varieties of factor inputs and in
promoting competition in the input market. We nest the two theories into
a calibrated model and use numerical simulations to reassess the welfare
gains/losses FDI may generate for the host country and compare them to
the more traditional gains. We also provide a quantitative assessment of
the magnitudes of the potential gains/losses arising separately from the
two views of the role of FDI.
In accordance with the ﬁrst view, our simulation results show that sub-
stantial welfare losses can indeed be brought about by FDI in the presence
of adverse selection in the domestic equity market. These losses can none-
theless be dominated by the gains induced by the technology transfer and
competition promotion eﬀects of FDI, i.e., the second view (cf. ﬁgures 9.1
a n d9 . 2a tac o m m o nl e v e lo fi n t e r e s tr a t ed i ﬀerential of, say, 1, where the
netgain is1.8percent ofpermanentconsumption). Amore rigorous assess-
ment of the net gains/losses from these two views taken together requires
blending the two models into a uniﬁed framework and redoing the simu-
lation exercise in that context. This more diﬃcult task is left for future re-
search.
Drawing on the eﬃciency implications of the two nontraditional roles,
corrective government policies are called for. Enforcement of better disclo-
sure rules for corporations and ﬁscal measures that will subsidize domestic
saving and that will tax excessive FDI may serve to counteract the adverse
selection problem triggered by FDI in the domestic stock market. Remov-
ing policy and institutional barriers, which may hinder other types of inter-
national capital ﬂows, can potentially mitigate the adverse selection prob-
lems in the domestic stock market as well.
Evidently, allowing the host country to use nontraditional new inputs—
as speciﬁed in this paper as a form of technology transfer or as a side
Social Beneﬁts and Losses from FDI 329beneﬁt from FDI—is not aﬀected by the magnitude of FDI, whether big
or small. Thus, there is no reason to subsidize FDI on this ground.12
Appendix
Derivation of First-Order Conditions for the Firm’s Investment
Problem in the FDI-Equity-Credit Equilibrium and the
Autarky Equilibrium
In the open economy case, the maximization of ﬁrm value V as speciﬁed
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where  is a Lagrange multiplier. Our numerical simulations suggest that,
in this case as well as in the case without domestic credit, there will be
domestic undersaving and foreign overinvestment, i.e., r 
 F(K) 
r*.
In the autarky case, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the maximization prob-
lema ss t a t edi neq u a ti o n( 4 )w i t hr es pec tt oKandεare
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12. Naturally, policy intervention may be called for if the set of goods available in the
economy as well as the degree of competition in the domestic input market are positively
related to the amount of FDI ﬂows. The latter involves, however, an antitrust issue that
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Comment Anne O. Krueger
This paper is a well-done and interesting exercise in which the authors
develop an asymmetric information model of foreign direct investment
(FDI). The driving factor in the model is the assumption that foreigners
have inside information about the prospects of the domestic ﬁrms into
which they buy. They then retain equity shares in ﬁrms with good pros-
pects, but sell shares in ﬁrms with less satisfactory prospects. Domestic
investors do not have this information, and buy shares on the domestic
capital market.
Because foreigners have selectively retained shares, the average return
on the domestic share market is less than it would have been had there
been less (or no) FDI. There is overinvestment by foreigners (who get
above-average rates of return because of their superior knowledge) and
undersavings by domestic residents (who are receiving below-average rates
of return), with a consequent welfare loss (which could be oﬀset by in-
creased competition, technology transfer, and other beneﬁts of FDI in
their model). Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (RSY) then simulate their model,
and conclude that welfare losses may well result from FDI based on plau-
sible estimates for the parameters.
The model is ingenious and well developed. It has long been known that
capital inﬂows in the presence of distortions could be immiserizing (see
Anne O. Krueger is the Herald L. and Caroline L. Ritch Professor of Economics, senior
fellow of the Hoover Institution, director of the Center for Research on Economic Develop-
ment and Policy Reform at Stanford University, and a research associate of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
332 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa YuenBrecher and Diaz-Alejandro 1977 for an early demonstration), and the
RSY result is another instance of that outcome. In the RSY speciﬁcation,
all ﬁrms are alike except that, in the production function for each ﬁrm,
there is a stochastic element which is not known ex ante. Once there is a
speciﬁc shock, insiders know about it and outsiders do not, so there is a
distortion. The result as modeled by RSY is a “lemons” problem for the
domestic capital market, as “good ﬁrms” are ones in which foreigners re-
tain their investments while “bad ﬁrms” are ones they remove from their
portfolios. FDI is thus a ﬁrm-speciﬁc equity investment on the part of for-
eigners.
While the model generates that result, one can question how applicable
it is to the real world. One might ﬁrst ask, if there is asymmetric informa-
tion, who is likely to be better informed: domestic residents or foreigners?
For the RSY model, the timing of who knows what and when is crucial to
the outcome: If domestic residents know, or sense, that there are problems
before foreigners do, the outcome could easily be reversed.
A second question relates to the behavior of domestic entrepreneurs
who know they have a good outcome. In the RSY model, they cannot
ﬁnance with equity because domestic residents will underprice their pros-
pects. From this speciﬁcation, a question arises as to what domestic entre-
preneurs do, and where domestic savings go. Does this imply that good
investments are not made at all? Why cannot domestic entrepreneurs at-
tract foreign capital?
While these questions are speciﬁc to the model, there are some more
general issues that give rise to concern. All production functions are as-
sumed to be alike, with the diﬀerence only in the stochastic element. In
the real world, managers diﬀer in their abilities: The same physical assets
may yield signiﬁcantly diﬀerent returns when placed in the hands of a
competent manager. If foreigners are competent managers, the beneﬁts of
FDI (as takeovers from incompetent managers) would be much greater
than can be modeled within the RSY framework.
Related to that consideration, FDI might be regarded as a mechanism
with which foreigners identify (and perhaps improve) domestic managers.
If the quality of domestic management increases as a result of FDI, the
welfare results would be quite diﬀerent than those that emanate from the
asymmetric information framework.
Finally, RSY ﬁnd that FDI goes to countries where there is good
growth, which they believe is consistent with their hypothesis. In fact, it is
equally consistent with the view that FDI goes to countries whose overall
economic policy framework is conducive to eﬃcient resource allocation;
and, countries with such policy frameworks achieve superior growth per-
formance.
Overall, then, I ﬁnd the paper interesting and useful in demonstrating
one mechanism through which FDI might interact with domestic distor-
Social Beneﬁts and Losses from FDI 333tions. I question, however, whether the sort of asymmetric information
assumed in the model is the type most frequently found in developing
countries, and believe that other alternatives—with the opposite implica-
tions for the impact of FDI—are at least as plausible as the RSY mech-
anism.
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Comment Mario B. Lamberte
The issues raised in this paper are indeed timely, especially since most
governments in Asia are now reviewing their policies on foreign capital
ﬂows in light of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. There is currently much talk
about favoring foreign direct investment (FDI) more than portfolio in-
ﬂows; however, the results of this paper suggest that an appropriate policy
for FDI is needed for a country to beneﬁt fully from it.
The paper attempts to formalize, in models, two nontraditional views
on FDI. I will comment on each model in order.
First Model
There is a need to remind ourselves of the diﬀerence between FDI and
portfolio inﬂows. Usually, FDI investors go to a developing country not to
buy an existing ﬁrm but to establish a new one, bringing with them their
capital and technology. Unlike portfolio investment inﬂows, FDI inﬂows
stay much longer. Foreign direct investments typically go into areas where
domestic investors do not go for lack of access to capital and technology.
All this implies that
1. FDI investors know already the productivity levels of the ﬁrms be-
fore they establish them as subsidiaries in developing countries;
2. Unlike short-term portfolio investments, FDI subsidiaries are kept
by parent ﬁrms because they confer strategic advantages to the parent
ﬁrms; and
3. As the paper suggests, local investors are facing liquidity constraint
and, given the huge amount of capital required to acquire the shares of
FDI investor in a ﬁrm, they cannot possibly aﬀord to buy and take over
the subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Aside from ﬁnancial constraint,
Mario B. Lamberte is president of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies
(PIDS).
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agement system to manage it. It is to be noted that subsidiaries are de-
pendent on their parent companies for so many things, one of which is
research and product development. Given the cost of R&D, the local in-
vestors will not be on equal footing with FDI investors when they acquire
subsidiaries of foreign companies.
The paper assumes that in the presence of a domestic credit market, “it
is often observed that FDI is highly leveraged domestically” (315). I tried
to check the situation in the Philippines and found that wholly foreign-
owned ﬁrms are the least leveraged ﬁrms (see ﬁg. 9C.1). The most highly
leveraged ﬁrms are the wholly domestically-owned ﬁrms.
There are several reasons for this. First, banks in host countries are usu-
ally subject to several regulations, one of which is the single-borrower’s
limit. Given that banks in developing countries are small, subsidiaries of
foreign corporations that normally have huge capital requirement easily
hit the single-borrower’s limit; thus they cannot borrow from domestic
banks as much as they want to. Secondly, developing countries usually
have laws limiting the amount that subsidiaries of foreign corporations can
borrow from the domestic market so as not to crowd out local ﬁrms as
well as to encourage them to bring in more capital. For example, in the
Philippines, subsidiaries of foreign corporations are allowed to borrow
from local banks up to only 50 percent of their capital.
If, indeed, FDI investors unload their shares in their subsidiaries in the
local market because their productivity is later found to be lower than
their “reservation” productivity level, then what will they do with the pro-
ceeds? Will they repatriate them? If so, then how will the process of FDI
inﬂows suggested by the model be aﬀected?
Second Model
The second model banks on the assumption that an increase in competi-
tion in the input market brought about by FDI inﬂows (given the perfectly
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Fig. 9C.1 Average debt-equity ratio of ﬁrms according to the extent of foreign
participationelastic supply of inputs from abroad) will drive w, the price of intermediate
inputs, to its competitive level. This implies that inputs brought in by FDI
and domestic inputs are perfect substitutes. This may not be an appro-
priate assumption because, typically, inputs brought in by FDI are diﬀer-
ent from those that are locally available. If so, then w will not be driven
down to its competitive level.
Finally, near the end of the paper, the authors state that their “...s i m u -
lation results show that substantial welfare losses can indeed be brought
about by FDI in the presence of adverse selection in the domestic equity
market. These losses can nonetheless be dominated by the gains induced
by the technology transfer and competition promotion eﬀects of FDI”
(329). This assertion is not clear to me from the analyses presented in the
paper. It seems to me that the two models have not yet been integrated.
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